Keep Ballots Secret: On the Futility of Social Learning in Decision
  Making by Voting by Rhim, Joong Bum & Goyal, Vivek K.
1Keep Ballots Secret:
On the Futility of Social Learning in Decision
Making by Voting
Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal
Abstract—We show that social learning is not useful in a
model of team binary decision making by voting, where each
vote carries equal weight. Specifically, we consider Bayesian
binary hypothesis testing where agents have any conditionally-
independent observation distribution and their local decisions
are fused by any L-out-of-N fusion rule. The agents make local
decisions sequentially, with each allowed to use its own private
signal and all precedent local decisions. Though social learning
generally occurs in that precedent local decisions affect an agent’s
belief, optimal team performance is obtained when all precedent
local decisions are ignored. Thus, social learning is futile, and
secret ballots are optimal. This contrasts with typical studies of
social learning because we include a fusion center rather than
concentrating on the performance of the latest-acting agents.
Index Terms—Bayesian hypothesis testing, distributed detec-
tion and fusion, sequential decision making, social learning, social
networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a set of agents making a decision collectively by
voting, with each agent having equal influence. It would seem
that the best collective decisions would come from each agent
having as much information as possible. For example, if the
voting is sequential rather than simultaneous, it would seem
that the collective decision would be improved by later-acting
agents having knowledge of the votes of the earlier-acting
agents. Using the methods of signal processing to analyze a
simple model, we show that this is not the case. In a social or
political context, this provides a mathematical justification for
the use of secret ballots, independent of any other merits, such
as avoiding bribery, intimidation, or insincere voting. To be
clear, though, our interest is in binary decision making under
uncertainty, not voting to express individual preferences.
In contemporary popular culture, the advantage of (prop-
erly) aggregating opinions of many (reasonably diverse and
independent) agents is known as “the wisdom of crowds” [1].
In statistical signal processing, this is nothing more than a
reduction in effective noise level from averaging or aggre-
gating. Suppose private signals observed by decision-making
agents are not perfectly informative due to noise. If N agents
share their private signals, assumed conditionally independent
and identically distributed (iid) given the unknown variable of
interest, then the sharing effectively increases the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) by a factor of N . Even if a communication
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capacity limit restricts the amount of shared information,
sharing still helps the detection system work much better than
a single-agent system. For example, in systems where agents
with Gaussian noise-corrupted observations share 1-bit signals
that are fused with the MAJORITY fusion rule, the effective
SNR is asymptotically increased by a factor of 2N/pi [2].
In this paper, we consider a team1 of agents that together
make a binary decision (between 0 and 1) by voting. Binary
decisions often made by teams include whether to make a
large purchase, whether to hire a job applicant, and whether
to convict a defendant; the final example highlights that
aggregation by voting, with equal weight to each vote, does
not imply the use of majority rule. The agents have their own
private signals and make local decisions in some preordained
order. Because of this ordering, we refer to the agents as a
sequence. The agents form a distributed detection and data
fusion system because their local decisions are fused to reach
a global decision, and only the global decision determines their
performance.
Now assume that the agents can watch other agents’ choices
as public signals so that they can use the predecessors’
decisions in decision making. The framework of sequential
decision making was independently introduced in [4] and [5].
A key concept in these works is herding. A herd of agents
takes place when all agents beyond some index have the same
local decision. Both works found that a herd of agents making
the incorrect decision might arise with positive probability
when private signals are bounded; this is a disappointing
occurrence since the optimal aggregation of private signals
would result in vanishing error probability. Subsequently, [6]
showed that agents will asymptotically settle on the correct
decision if private signals are unbounded. Recently, [7] extends
the result to general network topologies where each agent can
observe decisions made by its neighbors instead of all previous
agents.
This work contrasts from previous works in two key ways:
we consider an arbitrary but finite number of agents N ; and
we consider any symmetric fusion of the local decisions (i.e.,
voting by an L-out-of-N rule2). Because the number of agents
is finite, presence or absence of herding is not central to our
study; a herd of agents might arise and yet form a small
1The term team implies that the agents have no conflicts of interest, which
here translates to agreement in the relative importance of false alarms and
missed detections [3].
2In the notation of L-out-of-N rule, N denotes the number of agents and
L denotes the minimum number of 1 votes for 1 to be the global decision.
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2fraction of the N total agents. Also, the fusion by voting makes
an early-acting agent important not only for its influence on
later-acting agents but also because its vote counts.
As the first to study this scenario, we ask whether it is
beneficial for the agents not only to send their local decisions
to the fusion center but also to share among themselves.
The public signals raise two changes to the model: the belief
update that is standard in social learning and a fusion rule
update that has not appeared previously in the context of social
learning.
Each agent will update its belief about the true state based
on the public signals (in a Bayesian setting) and design a better
decision rule. The previous decisions reflecting the private
signals of the precedent agents contain information that the
following agents do not have. If an agent observes that most
predecessors have chosen 1, then the agent will have a stronger
belief on 1 and a weaker belief on 0. Hence, the update of
belief is a positive feedback that encourages an agent to follow
the precedents.
Each agent will adjust the fusion rule based on the public
signals. For example, if the first agent has chosen 0, then
the L-out-of-N fusion rule changes to the L-out-of-(N−1)
rule for the remaining agents. And if the second agent has
subsequently chosen 1, then the fusion rule becomes the
(L−1)-out-of-(N−2) rule, etc. Thus, the previous decisions
put a following agent in a different position; if most previous
agents have chosen 1, then a few more votes for 1 will
determine the global decision as 1. This fact makes the agent
become more careful to choose 1. The evolution of the fusion
rule is a negative feedback that discourages an agent to follow
the precedents.
Our mathematical analysis shows that those positive and
negative effects are exactly canceled out and that the optimal
decision rules with public signals are equal to those without
public signals. It implies that observing public signals is
practically useless.
Section II describes our decision-making model formally.
Section III provides results for two agents and Section IV
extends the results for an arbitrary number of agents. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. THE FORMAL MODEL
A team of N agents—Alexis, Blake, ..., Norah—performs
a binary hypothesis test for an object. The agents are aware
of the prior probabilities of the object in state H = 0 and
in state H = 1, which are denoted by p0 = P{H = 0} and
p1 = P{H = 1} = 1 − p0. The agents individually receive
private signals about the state and perform tests to make their
own binary decisions Ĥi. They are a team in the sense that
they place the same relative importance on false alarms and
missed detections and share a common goal to minimize the
cost of global decisions. The cost for a false alarm is c10 and
the cost for a missed detection is c01. Thus, for the L-out-of-
N fusion rule, the average cost (i.e., Bayes risk) is given as
follows:
R = c10p0P{
∑N
i=1 Ĥi ≥ L |H = 0}
+ c01p1P{
∑N
i=1 Ĥi ≤ L− 1 |H = 1}. (1)
The private signals Yi are conditionally iid given the state
H , with the likelihood function fYi|H . In other words, all
agents observe private signals of equal quality. Bayesian agents
use a likelihood ratio test (LRT) as the optimal decision rule,
which chooses Ĥi = 1 if the ratio fYi|H(yi | 1)/fYi|H(yi | 0)
is greater than a certain threshold [8], [9]. We assume that the
likelihood ratio is an increasing function of yi so that the LRT
is simplified to a decision rule with a decision threshold λi:
yi
Ĥi(yi)=1
R
Ĥi(yi)=0
λi. (2)
We will compare the optimal decision thresholds in the
following two scenarios:
1) A common distributed detection system: Agents only
observe private signals and make local decisions in par-
allel without knowing other agents’ decisions. Then their
decisions are fused by a specific L-out-of-N rule to make
a global decision. Alternatively, we call this scenario
parallel decision making.
2) A distributed detection system combined with sequential
decision making: Agents observe private signals and
sequentially make local decisions. Before each agent
makes a decision, the agent observes precedents. Then
their decisions are fused by a specific L-out-of-N rule to
make a global decision.
Our notations for decision thresholds are distinguished in the
two scenarios: λ in the first scenario and ρ in the second
scenario.
In Scenario 1, we will say that the optimal decision thresh-
olds are identical, i.e., λ∗1 = · · · = λ∗N for the following
reasons: Using identical decision thresholds is asymptotically
optimum for the binary hypothesis testing problem [10].
Furthermore, by numerical experiments, it turns out that con-
straining to identical decision rules causes little or no loss of
performance for finite N and the corresponding optimal fusion
rule has the L-out-of-N form [11]. Our numerical experiments
(not reported here) for fixed fusion rules and conditionally iid
private signals show that the optimal decision thresholds are
in fact identical at least for any N ≤ 7 in multiple cases with
such as Gaussian and exponential likelihood functions.
We use P Ie and P
II
e as notations for probabilities of Type I
(false alarm) and Type II (missed detection) errors. We use a
subscript index to indicate a specific agent. For example, error
probabilities of Alexis are written as
P Ie,1 = P{Ĥ1 = 1 |H = 0}, P IIe,1 = P{Ĥ1 = 0 |H = 1}.
(3)
Since all agents have equally good private signals, their error
probabilities are the same as (3) in the parallel decision-
making scenario.
In Scenario 2, the agents sequentially make hard decisions:
Alexis first makes a decision Ĥ1, Blake next makes a decision
Ĥ2, and so on. Predecessors’ decisions, which we call public
signals, may cause different error probabilities by following
agents. In this case, we use superscript notation to specify
the public signals. For example, P I0e,2 denotes the probability
of Type I error of Blake (the second agent) upon observing
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Fig. 1. Two agents and a fusion center. (a) Parallel decision making. (b)
Sequential decision making.
Ĥ1 = 0 and P II01e,3 denotes the probability of Type II error of
Chuck (the third agent) upon observing Ĥ1 = 0 and Ĥ2 = 1.
We sometimes use a notation like P I0e,3 that specifies Alexis’s
decision as Ĥ1 = 0 but does not specify Blake’s decision Ĥ2.
Once the error probabilities of all agents are computed, the
conditional probabilities of the global decision being in error
are given from the L-out-of-N fusion rule:
P IE = pĤ|H(1 | 0) =
N∑
n=L
∑
I⊆[N]
|I|=n
∏
i∈I
P Ie,i
∏
j∈[N ]\I
(
1− P Ie,j
)
,
P IIE = pĤ|H(0 | 1) =
N∑
n=N−L+1
∑
I⊆[N]
|I|=n
∏
i∈I
P IIe,i
∏
j∈[N ]\I
(
1− P IIe,j
)
,
where [N ] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. The Bayes risk is
based on the team decision:
R = c10p0P
I
E + c01p1P
II
E . (4)
III. TWO AGENTS
Let us consider the simplest case for distributed detection,
which is N = 2. We will compare two cases, which are
depicted in Fig. 1. We start from an assumption that Alexis
does not change her strategy whether the agents observe public
signals or not. The assumption comes from an intuition that
she is the first agent to make a decision and does not observe
any previous decisions in both scenarios.
Theorem 1. Suppose that sharing previous decisions does not
change Alexis’s decision rule. Then, for N = 2 and any L-
out-of-N fusion rule, the existence of public signals does not
affect the decision strategies of agents.
Proof: There are only two meaningful fusion rules when
N = 2: 1-out-of-2 (OR) rule and 2-out-of-2 (AND) rule. Let’s
consider the OR rule first.
In the parallel decision-making scenario, the Bayes risk is
given by
Rp = c10p0
(
P Ie,1 + P
I
e,2 − P Ie,1P Ie,2
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
II
e,2, (5)
where Alexis’s error probabilities P Ie,1 and P
II
e,1 are governed
by her decision threshold λ1 and Blake’s P Ie,2 and P
II
e,2 are
governed by his decision threshold λ2. Their optimal decision
thresholds λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 are the minimizer of (5).
In the sequential decision-making scenario, Blake observes
Alexis’s decision ̂1. He makes a decision carefully only if
her decision is Ĥ1 = 0 because Ĥ1 = 1 already determines
the global decision as Ĥ = 1. Thus, we take care of Alexis’s
decision threshold, ρ1, and Blake’s decision threshold upon
observing Ĥ1 = 0, which is denoted by ρ02, only. The Bayes
risk is given by
Rs = c10p0
(
P Ie,1 +
(
1− P Ie,1
)
P I0e,2
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
II0
e,2 , (6)
which is exactly the same formula as (5). Therefore, the
optimal decision thresholds would be the same as those in
the first case:
ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1, ρ
0∗
2 = λ
∗
2, (7)
and ρ∗1 = ρ0
∗
2 because λ
∗
1 = λ
∗
2. Since we do not care about
Blake’s decision threshold when Ĥ1 = 1, ρ12, we can set
ρ1∗2 = ρ
0∗
2 , too. Therefore, Alexis and Blake’s optimal decision
thresholds are not affected by the existence and the value of
the public signal Ĥ1.
The same statement for the AND fusion rule can also be
proven in a similar way.
IV. N AGENTS
In Section III, we have shown that knowing Alexis’s deci-
sion practically does not change Blake’s optimal strategies for
N = 2 and any L-out-of-N fusion rule. Now let us expand
the problem to a general N -agent problem by mathematical
induction.
Theorem 2. Suppose that sharing previous decisions does not
change Alexis’s decision rule (i.e., ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1). If the existence of
the public signals does not affect optimal decision thresholds
of a team of N agents for a specific N and any K-out-of-
N fusion rule, then the existence of the public signals also
does not affect optimal decision thresholds of a team of N+1
agents and any L-out-of-(N+1) fusion rule.
Proof: First, consider the parallel decision-making sce-
nario with N+1 agents. Since a decision of an agent is critical
only if the other N local decisions are L−1 ones and N−L+1
zeros, the optimal decision threshold λ∗ is the solution to3
fY |H(λ | 1)
fY |H(λ | 0) =
c10p0
(
N
L−1
) (
P Ie
)L−1 (
1− P Ie
)N−L+1
c01p1
(
N
N−L+1
)
(P IIe )
N−L+1
(1− P IIe )L−1
=
c10p0
(
P Ie
)L−1 (
1− P Ie
)N−L+1
c01p1 (P IIe )
N−L+1
(1− P IIe )L−1
, (8)
where we embed the idea that the optimal decision thresholds
of all agents are identical.
Next, consider the sequential decision-making scenario
when the agents observe previous decisions. The Bayes risk
3Please see [12] for a detailed description of how (8) is derived.
4is given by
Rp = c10p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≥ L | Ĥ1 = H = 0
}
+ c10p0P
I
e,1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≥ L− 1 | Ĥ1 = 1, H = 0
}
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≤ L− 1 | Ĥ1 = 0, H = 1
}
+ c01p1
(
1− P IIe,1
)
P
{
N+1∑
n=2
Ĥn ≤ L− 2 | Ĥ1 = H = 1
}
, R0
(
p0(1−P Ie,1)+p1P IIe,1
)
+R1
(
p0P
I
e,1+p1(1−P IIe,1)
)
,
(9)
where R0 and R1 are specified in (11) and (12) and we define
q0 ,
p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
+ p1P
II
e,1
= P{H = 0 | Ĥ1 = 0},
q1 ,
p0P
I
e,1
p0P
I
e,1 + p1
(
1− P IIe,1
) = P{H = 0 | Ĥ1 = 1}. (10)
When the agents 2, . . . , N+1 observe that Ĥ1 = 0, their
optimal decision strategy is to minimize the term R0 from
(9):
R0 = c10q0P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
0
n ≥ L |H = 0
}
+ c01(1− q0)P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
0
n ≤ L− 1 |H = 1
}
, (11)
where the condition Ĥ1 = 0 is intended in the term Ĥ0n. Please
note that R0 is the same as the Bayes risk of N agents when
the prior probability is q0 and fusion is by the L-out-of-N
rule. It implies that the optimal decision thresholds of Agents
2, . . . , N+1 are the same as those of N agents with prior
probability q0 and the L-out-of-N fusion rule.
Likewise, when the agents 2, . . . , N+1 observe that Ĥ1 =
1, their optimal decision strategy is to minimize the term R1
from (9):
R1 = c10q1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
1
n ≥ L− 1 |H = 0
}
+ c01(1− q1)P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
1
n ≤ L− 2 |H = 1
}
. (12)
Their optimal decision thresholds are the same as those of N
agents with prior probability q1 and (L−1)-out-of-N fusion
rule. Fig. 2 depicts the evolution of the problem corresponding
to Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
Let us find the optimal thresholds ρ0∗2 , . . . , ρ
0∗
N+1 in Problem
B0 in Fig. 2. In fact, the N agents in Problem B0 also observe
public signals. However, because of the condition that the
existence of the public signals does not affect optimal decision
thresholds of a team of N agents for any K-out-of-N fusion
rule, we can find the optimal thresholds as if the agents do
not observe the public signals. Since a decision of an agent is
critical only if the other N−1 local decisions are L−1 ones
and N−L zeros, the optimal decision threshold ρ0∗ is the
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• OR rule
1
H1 = 0ˆ
H1 = 1ˆ
• N+1 agents
• Belief: p0
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H1 = 1ˆ
Problem A
Problem B0
Problem B1
Optimal 
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1 1
Fig. 2. An (N+1)-agent problem is divided into two N -agent problems
depending on Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
solution to
fY |H(ρ0 | 1)
fY |H(ρ0 | 0) =
c10q0
(
N−1
L−1
) (
P I0e
)L−1 (
1−P I0e
)N−L
c01(1−q0)
(
N−1
N−L
) (
P II0e
)N−L (
1−P II0e
)L−1
=
c10p0
(
1−P Ie
) (
P I0e
)L−1 (
1−P I0e
)N−L
c01p1P IIe
(
P II0e
)N−L (
1−P II0e
)L−1 ,
(13)
where q0 is replaced by (10). Due to the assumption that ρ∗1 =
λ∗1, P
I
e and P
II
e in (13) are the same as P
I
e and P
II
e in (8).
Comparing (13) to (8), we can find that they have the same
solutions, i.e., ρ0∗i = λ
∗
i . Therefore, the agents should not
change their decision thresholds after observing Ĥ1 = 0.
We can also find the optimal thresholds ρ1∗2 , . . . , ρ
1∗
N+1 in
Problem B1 in Fig. 2 by looking at the N -agent problem
without public signals:
fY |H(ρ1 | 1)
fY |H(ρ1 | 0) =
c10q1
(
N−1
L−2
) (
P I1e
)L−2 (
1−P I1e
)N−L+1
c01(1−q1)
(
N−1
N−L+1
) (
P II1e
)N−L+1 (
1−P II1e
)L−2
=
c10p0P
I
e
(
P I1e
)L−2 (
1−P I1e
)N−L+1
c01p1 (1−P IIe )
(
P II1e
)N−L+1 (
1−P II1e
)L−2 .
(14)
Again, due to the assumption that ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1, P
I
e and P
II
e in
(14) are the same as P Ie and P
II
e in (8). We reach to the same
statement that the two equations have the same solutions, i.e.,
ρ1∗i = λ
∗
i , by comparing (14) to (8). Thus, the agents should
not change their decision thresholds after observing Ĥ1 = 1.
Consequently, for a team of N + 1 agents and any L-out-
of-(N+1) rule, their optimal decision thresholds are the same
whether they observe previous decisions or not.
We want to clarify the term belief in Fig. 2, which is
distinguished from prior probability. The prior probability
is fixed as p0 and known to all agents. The belief is how
probable the agents think H = 0 is. The belief can change
as agents observe previous decisions even though the prior
probability cannot. The above proof does not mean that the
prior probability is changed after the agents observe Alexis’s
decision. It is saying that the problem of determining optimal
thresholds upon observing Alexis’s decision is equivalent to
Problem B0 or B1 corresponding to Ĥ1.
5The essence of this proof is to show that the effect of
new fusion rules, L-out-of-N and (L−1)-out-of-N , exactly
cancels out the effect of new beliefs q0 and q1 . It is observed
when we compare (13) and (14) to (8). As we mentioned
earlier in Section I, the public signals seem to have the same
amount of a positive feedback and a negative feedback. From
an overall standpoint, the public signals neither harm nor help
the decision-making task.
Corollary 3. Suppose that sharing previous decisions does not
change Alexis’s decision rule (i.e., ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1). For any N and
L-out-of-N fusion rule, the existence of the public signals does
not affect optimal decision thresholds of a team of N agents.
Proof: By mathematical induction, it is true from Theo-
rems 1 and 2.
Corollary 3 is trivial for N = 1 and is proven by Theorem 1
for N = 2. For N ≥ 3, we can iteratively break down the
problem until we have 2N−2 two-agent problems like in Fig. 2.
The backward process from the leaves (two-agent problems)
to the root (N -agent problem) will demonstrate Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 only refers to the optimal decision thresholds.
However, it implies that team’s performance (i.e. Bayes risk)
is not affected by the public signals. This is because decision
thresholds determine the probabilities of errors and, thus, the
Bayes risk.
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed sequential decision making in a dis-
tributed detection and fusion system by a team of agents.
It would be intuitively desired to have as much information
as possible when performing a hypothesis test. However, our
study has revealed that it is useless to observe other agents’
decisions in this system. The agents just need to individually
make the best decisions.
This result is justified by symmetries throughout our model.
The first symmetry is the equal quality of private signals due
to the identical likelihood functions. The second symmetry is
the equal (1-bit) votes that agents have. The third symmetry
is the equal weights of the votes implied by the L-out-of-N
fusion rule.
One interpretation of the main result is as follows: Each
agent sends 1 bit of information about its private signal to
the fusion center. If Blake refers to Alexis’s decision, then the
fusion center effectively receives less than 1 bit of information
about Blake’s private signal from him. Therefore, in order
to prevent such an efficiency loss, Blake should make a
reasonable decision only based on his own private signal.
This result is obtained under an assumption that Alexis
uses the same decision thresholds in both scenarios, and the
assumption is not unreasonable. The assumption is trivially
true for N = 1. It is also true for N = 2; our proof of
Theorem 1 even does not use this assumption. In addition,
we have confirmed that it is true at least for any N ≤ 9 by
numerical experiments. This assumption heuristically seems
true, and our future work is to verify it for arbitrary N .
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